Regional Inequality and Convergence in Europe, 1995–2005 by Melchior, Arne
[748]
NUPIWorkingPaper
Department of International 
Economics
Regional Inequality and Convergence  
in Europe, 1995–2005 
Arne Melchior 
Norsk
Utenrikspolitisk
Institutt
Norwegian Institute
of International
Affairs
Utgiver: 
Copyright:
ISBN:
Besøksadresse:
Addresse:
Internett:
E-post:
Fax:
Tel:
NUPI
© Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt 2008
978-82-7002-210-6
Alle synspunkter står for forfatternes regning. De må ikke 
tolkes som uttrykk for oppfatninger som kan tillegges Norsk 
Utenrikspolitisk Institutt. Artiklene kan ikke reproduseres 
– helt eller delvis – ved trykking, fotokopiering eller på 
annen måte uten tillatelse fra forfatterne.
Any views expressed in this publication are those of the 
author. They should not be interpreted as reﬂecting the 
views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 
The text may not be printed in part or in full without the 
permission of the author.
C.J. Hambrosplass 2d
Postboks 8159 Dep. 
0033 Oslo 
www.nupi.no
pub@nupi.no
[+ 47] 22 36 21 82
[+ 47] 22 99 40 00
[Abstract]  The paper presents new results on within-country regional inequality in per capita 
income for 36 countries during 1995-2005; focusing on Europe but with some non-European 
countries included for comparison. In 23 of the 36 countries there was a signiﬁcant increase 
in regional inequality during the period, and in only three cases there was a reduction. Re-
gional inequality increased in all countries of Central and Eastern Europe, while for most 
Western European countries there was little change. For the EU-27 as a whole, there was a 
modest increase in within-country regional inequality, but convergence across countries. The 
latter effect was quantitatively more important, so on the whole there was income conver-
gence in the EU-27, especially after 2000. Regional inequality is particularly important for 
some large middle-income countries such as China, Russia and Mexico. In such countries 
there may however be considerable price differences across regions, and the use of common 
price deﬂators for the whole country may lead to a biased assessment of regional inequality. 
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1. Introduction* 
 
In the EU-15, there was income convergence between countries, and mod-
est changes in inequality between regions within countries (see e.g. 
Combes and Overman 2005, Cappelen et al. 1999, and also Ben David 
1996). Faster growth in the relatively less prosperous countries such as 
Ireland and the new Mediterranean members (Greece, Portugal, Spain) 
contributed to country convergence in income levels, while intra-national 
regional inequality changed only modestly.  
 In this paper, we examine whether this characterisation of income 
inequality between countries and regions in Europe also applies to the 
most recent decade; a period of dramatic change in the economic geogra-
phy of Europe. Since the fall of the iron curtain, the map of Europe has 
changed due to transition, increased east-west economic integration and 
recently the enlargement of the EU to encompass 27 members. The pur-
pose of this paper is to provide comprehensive and updated evidence on 
the development of domestic regional inequality in Europe during this last 
decade. In the light of EU enlargement and the transformation of Europe, a 
main focus is on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEA), but 
other countries, within as well as outside Europe, are also analysed in or-
der to provide a comparative perspective.  
Following a steadily growing amount of research and documenta-
tion, it has become a widespread belief that regional disparities in CEE are 
large and increasing. EU enlargement toward south and east may have 
contributed to income convergence across countries, but at the same time, 
disparities within some countries have increased. Earlier studies on re-
gional inequality in Europe include Römisch (2001, covering nine CEE 
countries during 1993-98), Förster et  al. (2003, covering four CEE coun-
tries in selected years between 1991 and 1999), and Landesmann and 
Römisch (2006, covering EU-27 during 1995-2002). These studies con-
firm increases in inter-regional inequality in CEE countries over the years 
studied, but also that the magnitude of this increase varied considerably 
across countries. The variability of results and fast changes over time sug-
gests that it makes sense to have a closer look as well as to provide new 
systematic evidence. In the paper, we also want to assess the relative im-
portance of within-country regional disparities; are these more or less im-
portant than income inequality across European countries, or other forms 
of domestic inequality?  
 Studying the change in regional inequality in CEE countries can be 
undertaken with data on these countries only. In order to conclude whether 
regional inequality in these countries is comparatively large, however, we 
need results for other countries as well. In the paper, we therefore include 
new evidence in inter-regional inequality not only for Western Europe, but 
also for some non-European countries. Hence the study presents a com-
                                                 
* I thank Maryla Maliszewska and Alfonso Irarrazabal for useful comments to an earlier 
draft. Financial support from the EU 6th Framework Programme and the Norwegian 
Research Council is gratefully acknowledged. Data were collected as part of the ENEPO 
project and I thank Fredrik Wilhelmsson and Linda Skjold Oksnes for their participation 
in this. I also thank colleagues at CEFIR/ Moscow and Kyiv School of Economics for 
their assistance in providing data for Russia and Ukraine, respectively.   
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prehensive and international comparative perspective on regional inequal-
ity. To our knowledge, it is the most comprehensive study of regional ine-
quality to date, in terms of country coverage. 
 Regional income inequality may also be considered as a component 
of overall domestic income inequality; along with (and partly overlapping 
with) rural-urban and class-based income divides. While e.g. the World 
Bank (2000) overwhelmingly documents the increase in inter-personal 
income inequality in most CEE countries, the relationship between re-
gional and inter-personal income inequality has not been fully examined. 
According to Kanbur and Venables (2007), some studies undertaken sug-
gest as a “typical” outcome  that inter-regional disparities may account for 
around ¼ of total domestic inequality. In the paper, we examine this rela-
tionship and find that there is great variation across countries.  
 The main purpose of the paper is to provide new evidence on re-
gional inequality rather than to explain it. We nevertheless provide a pre-
liminary examination of some aspects. For the CEE countries, a recurring 
theme is that a major part of the increase in inter-regional inequality was 
accounted for by the growth of capital regions. Brülhart and Koenig (2006) 
found, for five CEE countries, that capital region concentration dominated 
the hypotheses based on the “new economic geography”. In the paper, we 
therefore check to what extent the increase in regional inequality is driven 
by growth in the capital regions. A second issue concerns price differences 
across regions: Most data on regional income does not adjust for price dif-
ferences across regions. If there are widely different inflation rates across 
regions, nominal income figures may be misleading. In the paper, we ex-
periment with regional price deflators for Russia in order to check the im-
portance of different price trends.  
 The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we describe data and 
the methodology used. In section 3, we examine the relative importance of 
international versus domestic regional inequality in the EU-27, and the 
overall extent of income convergence. In section 4, we examine changes in 
domestic regional inequality in a number of countries, in order to assess 
whether it is true that regional inequality in the CEE countries is “large 
and increasing”. In section 5, it is shown that standard panel regression 
techniques may not be appropriate in the analysis of EU-wide regional 
convergence since the relatively poor regions grow faster at the EU-wide 
level, but they grow slower at the at the country level, at least for the 
poorer countries. In section 6, the relative importance of regional dispari-
ties in the context of overall domestic income inequality is analysed. In 
section 7, we shed light on the role of capital regions for regional inequal-
ity. In section 8, we use data on Russia in order to assess the importance of 
different price trends across regions. Some concluding comments are pro-
vided in Section 9.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
 
Given the purpose of analysing regional and between-country inequality 
using comprehensive and comparative international data, the analysis cov-
ers 36 countries: 
 7
- EU-27: Regional income data from Eurostat’s Regio database cover 23 
countries (Denmark is missing, and Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta 
have limited regional subdivisions). 
- Other Western European countries: Norway is included.1 
- Eastern Neighbourhood and applicant countries: Croatia, Russia, Tur-
key and Ukraine. 
- Non-European countries included for comparison: USA, Canada, Mex-
ico, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia.  
 
Table A1 in  the Appendix describes data sources. The main data source, 
covering the EU and some OECD countries, is the Regio database of Eu-
rostat. For Russia, Ukraine and China, data from national statistical agen-
cies are applied.   
 For the EU-27, Turkey and Norway, regional data are available at 
different classification levels, according to the so-called NUTS nomen-
clature (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, see Eurostat 
2007). When we use regional averages for income, the level of inequality 
depends on the classification; the more detailed is the classification, the 
more inequality there is. For the EU-27 and Norway, we therefore present 
results at different classification levels in order to check how results are 
affected by classification. While we have more or less complete data for 
income and population at the country level, there are more missing data at 
the more detailed levels. For example, less than half of Poland is covered 
at the more detailed NUTS3 level. Table 1 gives an overview of data cov-
erage for the EU-27. 
 
Table 1: Data coverage, regional data for EU-27 for 1995-2005 
 
Number of 
countries or 
regions in 
EU-272 
Average 
population 
2005 
Period 
% of EU-
27 income 
covered by 
data 
% of EU-
27 popu-
lation 
covered 
by data 
Number  
of units 
used in 
analysis 
1995-97 98.4-98.6 100 Country 
level 27 18155 1998-2005 100 100 25-27 
1995-97 97.9-98.6 100 NUTS1 97 5053 1998-2005 100 100 96 
1995-97 97.4-98.0 98.5 NUTS2 271 1809 1998-2005 99.5 98.5-99.6 259-264 
1995-97 94.1-94.9 91.3 NUTS3 1303 376 1998-2005 96.3-96.5 90.1-92.2 
1178-
1219 
 
For the calculation of income inequality indexes, we need annual data for 
population and income. We use GDP data, and since we also compare dif-
ferent countries we need data in purchasing power parities (PPP). Such 
                                                 
1 Switzerland and Liechtenstein are included in some country comparisons, but regional 
income and population data for the former are not available in the Regio database. 
 
2 The figures apply from 2008. Before that, the numbers were 95, 268 and 1284 at the 
NUTS 1, 2 and 3 levels, respectively.  
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data are missing for Bulgaria in 1995 and Romania in 1995-97, so even at 
the country level and the NUTS1 level, some data are missing.  
 
- At the NUTS2 level, data are missing for the two mentioned coun-
tries/years and for Denmark in most years. On the whole, data cover-
age is nevertheless good at the NUTS2 level; covering more than 97% 
of the total for all years during the period studied.  
- At the NUTS3 level, more data are missing and the coverage drops to 
90-92% of the total EU population. The main omission is Poland, 
where NUTS3 data cover less than half of the regions, including some 
of the economically most important regions. In our NUTS3 calcula-
tions, all data for Poland are therefore deleted.  
 
For some calculations, we want a fully consistent time series with constant 
data coverage over time. In other cases, we allow minor variations in the 
number of regions covered. The number of regions covered by the analysis 
therefore varies slightly, as shown in the column to the far right.  
For the EU-27, we report regional inequality at various levels, de-
pending on country size: For larger countries (France, Germany, Spain, 
UK, Poland) we even report NUTS1 calculations, while at the other end 
we find Cyprus and Luxembourg which have no regional subdivision even 
at the NUTS3 level. For these as well as Malta (two regions at the NUTS3 
level) we naturally do not report any inequality calculations at the country 
level. Some of the other small EU countries (the Baltic countries, Ireland 
and Slovenia) only have 1-2 units at the NUTS2 level, so for these we only 
report NUTS3 calculations. 
 For non-EU countries, data coverage in terms of years varies across 
countries.  Table A2 in the Appendix shows the years covered by the data 
and the number of regions in each case. 12 non-EU countries are covered. 
Observe that the size of regions in terms of population varies considerably 
across countries: For example in China, the average population of prov-
inces is 43 millions; i.e. much larger than average country size within the 
EU-27. Hence it may not be appropriate to compare calculations for China 
with indexes for other countries based on more disaggregated data.  
 In Section 5, we illustrate some challenges involved when using 
growth regressions in the analysis of convergence. If such regressions are 
weighted by population, one may obtain similar results at the country level 
as those based on inequality measures such as Gini or Theil coefficients. 
For the analysis of EU-wide convergence, the heterogeneity of outcomes 
at a country level represents a problem for using standard panel regression 
techniques. Using inequality measures, this heterogeneity may be exam-
ined more easily and transparently. This is one reason why the analysis 
here is based on standard inequality measures. 
In Appendix Table B, we report more than 600 Gini coefficients for 
regional inequality at the country level. These indexes are population-
weighted, so large and populous regions have more influence. A given 
Gini coefficient can be obtained by means of different underlying distribu-
tions. In Diagram 1, we illustrate two hypothetical cases.  
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Diagram 1: Distributions underlying the Gini coefficient 
 
In the diagrams, the regions are ranked by income levels (income per cap-
ita) and the two axes measure the cumulative shares of population (hori-
zontally) and total income (vertically). Due to the ranking of regions by 
income level, the resulting solid Lorenz curves (the smooth curve to the 
left, the kinked curve to the right) become gradually steeper as we move 
from left to right. The ratio between the areas A/(A+B) is the Gini coeffi-
cient. If all regions had the same income per capita, the Lorenz curve 
would coincide with the diagonal and the Gini would be zero.  
Diagram 1 illustrates that similar value for the Gini can be obtained 
with quite different underlying distributions. In the case to the left, there is 
a distribution with income levels gradually increasing across regions. In 
the right hand case, most regions are equally poor and a large section of 
the Lorenz curve is a straight line, but one or a few regions to the right 
have a large share of the income. In our sample, Russia is somewhere be-
tween the illustrated situations, with modest income gaps between the 
majority of regions but a few far ahead of the others. If e.g. regional ine-
quality increases mainly because a few regions grow faster (e.g. capital 
regions) we will get closer to the right hand side illustration.  
 The Gini coefficient has many plausible properties and it is easy to 
interpret; hence we “follow the crowd” in the literature by using it for the 
calculation of within-country inequality. For a review of methodological 
issues, see e.g. Cowell (2000). When we compare within-country regional 
inequality with inequality across countries, the Gini coefficient neverthe-
less has the shortcoming that it is not decomposable or additive so that we 
can say that “regional inequality constitutes x% of total inequality”. For 
that purpose we therefore use the Theil index, which is indeed decom-
posable so that such statements can be underpinned. The decomposed 
Theil index can be written as: 
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Here the Theil index T is decomposed into three terms; (i) between coun-
tries, (ii) between regions within countries, and (iii) between persons 
within regions. The s terms represent shares of total income (in our calcu-
lations this is for EU-27) for countries, regions and persons, respectively. 
yeu, yc and yr represent, respectively, average income per capita for all re-
gions and countries taken together (all EU), individual countries, and indi-
vidual regions, and yp is the income of each person. In our case we have no 
data for individual income, so we neglect the inter-personal income com-
ponent and assume (implicitly) that all persons have income equal to the 
region average. Then the last term is zero and disappears so we have:  
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which is the formula used.  
For the EU countries, we use PPP data where income is adjusted 
for price level differences across countries. At the national level, for the 
calculation of within-country inequality, it does not matter whether we use 
PPP income data or data based on nominal exchange rates or current 
prices, as long as it is a proportional scaling of the income for all regions. 
Similarly, it does not matter for country-level calculations whether we use 
fixed or current prices as long as the scaling for all regions is the same. We 
do not currently have regional PPP data available. This is a potential 
measurement error that we shall revert to later; if inflation rates differ 
across regions, income should be adjusted for this and non-adjusted data 
may be misleading. For some countries, this may be a serious issue and 
some caution should thus be exercised when interpreting results based on 
common deflators for all regions within a country. 
 As expected, we observe from Appendix B that more disaggregated 
data give higher Gini coefficients. The gap varies, however, very much 
across countries. For example, the level of regional inequality in France is 
more than doubled when we pass from NUTS2 to NUTS3. For Sweden, on 
the other hand, the gap is very small. We do not examine the reasons why 
this varies so much; it may potentially be related to specific institutional 
characteristics of the regional classification of each country.   
 What is useful to observe, however, is that the change in inequality 
over time is often very similar at different aggregation levels. This is 
shown in Diagram 2, where the percentage point change in the Gini is re-
ported at different NUTS classifications for each country. The time period 
covered is mainly 1995-2005, or in a few cases shorter (as seen from 
Appendix Tables A and B). 
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Diagram 2: Change in regional inequality at different 
aggregation levels
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From Diagram 2 it is evident that changes in regional inequality measured 
at different NUTS levels are closely correlated; In fact the correlation be-
tween results at NUTS2 and NUTS3 is at 0.98.3 Hence even if the reported 
level of inequality is significantly affected by classification, the change in 
this level is fairly similar across classifications. This indicates that changes 
in regional inequality are driven mainly by growth differences across 
“major” regions within each country, and that more “localised” regional 
variation plays a less important role. A practical implication is that results 
at the NUTS2 level, where we have better data coverage than for NUTS3, 
should give a fairly reliable picture of changes in inequality. We will re-
vert to the country-level results later, after examining the relative role of 
inequality across and within countries. 
                                                 
3 Results for NUTS1 are reported only for 7 cases so the number of observations is small, 
but also here the correlation is high, in the range 0.94 (with NUTS3) and 0.99 (with 
NUTS2). 
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 Observe that inequality measures are generally insensitive to 
changes in the ranking of countries: Say, for example, that in a country 
there is growth in the west and stagnation in the east because some regions 
are closer to the EU markets. This may correspond to large changes for 
individual regions but inequality measures such as the Gini or Theil in-
dexes could be unaffected. Hence our methods do not capture all types of 
spatial changes in inequality. In Melchior (2008), methodologies for ana-
lysing such spatial aspects of regional inequality are developed. 
 
3. The relative importance of between-country and within-country 
inequality in the EU 
 
As noted in the introduction, a core issue is whether there has been income 
convergence in Europe as a whole, and the role played by regional dis-
parities in this context. In order to address these issues, we report in 
Appendix Table C Theil indexes for the EU-27, and Gini coefficients for 
the EU-15, EU-27 and EEA (the European Economic Area).4  
Diagram 3 shows Theil indexes for EU-27 during the period 1998-
2005. 1995-1997 is not included since Romania is missing for these years 
and we want to have a consistent time series with the highest possible data 
coverage.  
 
Diagram 3: Between-country vs. within-country regional 
inequality in EU-27
Theil indexes, 1998-2005, NUTS2 classification
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The lower curve shows that for the EU-27, the within-country inter-re-
gional component of inequality has increased slightly but not dramatically. 
                                                 
4 At the NUTS2 and NUTS3 level, we only have data for Norway so the results for EU-27 
and EEA at these levels are very similar. 
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The upper curve, which includes between-country inequality, falls consid-
erably after the year 2000 and this shows that convergence across coun-
tries clearly outweighs the modest increase in within-country regional ine-
quality. Hence for the EU-27, the trend is qualitatively similar to the pat-
tern observed for EU-15 in the preceding decade: There is on the whole 
convergence, and this is driven by the between-country changes. 
 Theil indexes at the NUTS3 level show a very similar pattern. In 
this case, the share of within-country regional inequality is higher, and at 
the end of the period it is clearly higher then the between-country compo-
nent. In 2005, the share of regional inequality in the total of re-
gional+country-level inequality in the EU-27 was 43% at the NUTS2 
level, and 64% at the NUTS3 level. Hence evaluated at the NUTS3 level, 
within-country regional inequality is now clearly more important than ine-
quality across countries. This provides another motivation for addressing 
regional disparities. In the policy context, one might say that formerly, 
differences across countries were the most important for European conver-
gence; from 2005 onward regional inequalities are at least as important. 
 The Gini index is not decomposable but we may obtain qualita-
tively similar information by comparing Ginis calculated at different levels 
of regional classification. This is shown in Diagram 4. 
 
Diagram 4: Spatial inequality in EU-27, 1995-2005
(Shift in data coverage from 1998)
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Here we also show calculations for 1995-98 excluding Romania and with 
some variability in data coverage, e.g. more data missing for 1995. Hence 
the trends for the curves with regional sub-division to the left may not be 
reliable. The lowest curve, at the country level, should however be reliable 
and suggest a fall in inequality across countries also in the period 1995-98. 
The curves to the right are more or less parallel, indicating that the fall in 
overall inequality is driven by the between-country component; as also 
confirmed by the Theil index calculations. 
 In 2005, the country-level Gini for the EU-27 was at 14%, while 
this measure for the EU-15 was at only 5%. Hence in the old EU, inequal-
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ity across countries is now modest.5 Wider European integration has in a 
sense added more between-country inequality, but from 2000 there has 
been a substantial reduction in this component as well. 
 
4. Trends in within-country regional inequality 
 
Diagram 3 showed, on the whole, a slight increase in within-country re-
gional inequality in the EU-27. Is this driven by higher regional inequality 
in CEE countries? In order to answer this question, we shall examine more 
closely the results in Appendix Table B on regional inequality at the na-
tional level. In Diagram 5, we show the Gini coefficients for 1995 and 
2005 (or the closest available years) for all the 36 countries covered in 
Appendix table B.  
 
Diagram 5: Regional inequality: Change in Gini coefficients from 1995 to 2005
(Note: Shorter time period for some countries, see note in text.)
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On the horizontal axis we show the Gini for 1995, and on the vertical axis 
the Gini for 2005. If a data point is at the 45º line, there was no change in 
the Gini. If it is above the line, there was an increase over time, and the 
vertical distance from the line measures the magnitude of this. By this 
measure, we observe that for all the CEE countries included, there was an 
increase. Except for Greece, all the “top countries” in terms of increasing 
                                                 
5 More details on the pattern of inequality in EU-15 are available in Appendix C. 
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regional inequality are CEE countries. The only deviation from this is Slo-
venia, which is closer to the 45º line and observed a more modest increase.  
 In our calculations, we have included a number of non-EU coun-
tries for comparison and we see that none of these are able to compete 
with CEE in terms of rising Ginis. This applies even for China, where it is 
well known that growth during the last decade has been higher in the 
coastal regions.6 Hence the results indeed confirm that from an interna-
tional comparative perspective, the rise in within-country regional ine-
quality in the CEE countries covered here has been particularly large dur-
ing the last decade.  
 Diagram 5 shows the simple change in Ginis over time but this is 
not fully representative for the change since some years are missing for a 
few countries. There may also be fluctuations over time so that the simple 
difference between the first and last year Ginis may not be representative 
for the trend. In order to correct for this, we regress the Ginis on a time 
trend variable and use the regression results to assess the trend change 
over time. The results are presented in Appendix Table D.   
 The regressions show a statistically significant trend towards 
higher inequality in 23 out of 36 countries, a reduction in three cases only 
(Austria, Turkey and Italy7), and ambiguous or non-significant changes in 
10 cases. We show the magnitude of changes by using the predicted 
change over 10 years, according to the regression estimates. This is shown 
in Diagram 6, for the (selection of) countries with the largest predicted 
increase in the Gini. Observe that numbers (2 or 3) in the country names 
refer to NUTS levels; e.g. “Latvia3” says that the result for Latvia is based 
on data at the NUTS3 classification. In the diagram, CEE countries are 
shown in darker colour. 
 
                                                 
6 The comparison with China is not fully ”fair” since there was a considerable increase in 
inter-provincial inequality in China during 1990-95. If we had included this, China would 
also have shown a sharper increase in the Gini. 
7 For Italy, this applies only at the NUTS1 and NUTS2 levels. 
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Diagram 6: Trends in regional inequality 1995-2005
10-year change based on regression of time trend.
Number in country name refers to NUTS classification level.
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Unsurprisingly, CEE countries dominate the ranking: among the top 10 
countries 9 are CEE, and the remaining ones (Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia) 
8 follow among the next 6, so 12 out of the top 16 are CEE. On the top, we 
find important Eastern neighbours of the EU-27, namely Ukraine and Rus-
sia. In sections 6 and 7, we examine further some aspects that are relevant 
for these countries. In particular, there is uncertainty about price changes 
at the regional level in Russia and there is therefore some uncertainty 
about the results shown above.  
 While the increase in regional inequality is a common feature for 
the CEEs, their levels still differ considerably. As seen from Diagram 5, 
these levels differ substantially across countries; ranging from 3% (South 
Korea) to 38% (Russia) in 2005. For the western European countries, a 
typical level seems to be a Gini of 10-15%, with Belgium as an outlier 
with 18-20% (depending on whether NUTS2 or NUTS3 data are used). In 
Diagram 7, we show the levels of inequality in 2005 for the countries with 
                                                 
8 For Croatia, the time series is very short so the time trend is not statistically significant 
even if there was an increase in the Gini. 
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data for that year. On top there are the EEA countries (23 EU countries 
plus Norway); in the middle we include Ginis for the EU-27 as a whole, 
and at the bottom there are other countries for comparison. 
 
Diagram 7: Levels of regional inequality in 2005
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When interpreting the table it has to be recalled that levels depend on ag-
gregation levels, and we therefore show results with different classifica-
tions. For example, China and the EU-27 as a whole may not be so differ-
ent if EU results at NUT2 or NUTS3 are applied, but the appropriate clas-
sification for the EU in this case could be the country level, and the gap 
 18
between EU-27 and China is then much larger. Even at a given classifica-
tion level, Appendix Table B shows that the average size of regions varies 
a lot. These classifications are heavily influenced by national institutional 
characteristics, and strict comparability across nations cannot be guaran-
teed. 
 With these caveats in mind, we observe that CEE countries are 
more dispersed on this ranking of levels, compared to the earlier ranking 
of changes. Some CEE countries still have levels of regional inequality 
close to the European “typical” level (Poland, Slovenia, Czech Republic, 
Lithuania). Among new CEE members, Hungary and Latvia stand out 
with clearly above-average regional disparities. And on the whole, it is 
clear that the new CEE members of the EU are disproportionately clus-
tered in the upper half of the EU/EEA ranking.  
Outside the EU, we find Russia and Ukraine on top, with levels 
comparable to China (and Mexico, if we consider data for earlier years).  
Croatia follows not far behind. So also here, CEE countries are above av-
erage. For Russia, Latvia and Ukraine, the levels as well as the increase 
over time are exceptionally high from an international comparative per-
spective. 
 
5. Inequality measures versus growth regression analysis of European 
convergence 
 
In the analysis of regional as well as national convergence, growth regres-
sion is an alternative method frequently applied (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 1995). In principle, our Ginis and the regressions should measure 
the same phenomena and they should therefore be correlated. This is in-
deed the case, but not perfectly and there are some differences.  
 In order to examine this, we run growth regressions for the EU-27 
as a whole, and for 23 of the individual EU-27 countries (plus Norway). 
We run standard growth regressions of the form  
 
ln(yi1/yi0) = a + b*ln(yi0) + ui 
 
Where yi1 and yi0 are income per capita levels in the first and last year for 
each region, respectively, ui is the residual9, and a and b are parameters to 
be estimated. A negative sign for b indicates so-called β convergence 
(ibid.); i.e. that initially poorer regions grew faster. A positive b indicates 
divergence. For a discussion, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 384).  For 
simplicity here we use the first and last year observations only; i.e. 1995 
and 2005 for most countries and 1998/2005 for Romania. We use NUTS3 
data except for Poland where we only have NUTS2. Observe that while 
the average number of observations is 57, this varies between 5 and 414 
and in four cases, the number of observations is less than 10. In these 
cases, the reliability of the regressions is evidently limited. 
                                                 
9 The regressions here are made in order to illustrate methodological issues and we do not 
undertake a full examination of possible violations of the assumption that residuals are 
normally and independently distributed. Hence we neglect e.g. spatial dependencies. 
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 For reasons that will soon become evident, we run four types of 
regressions; (i) ordinary OLS, (ii) weighted least squares, (iii) robust re-
gression, and (iv) robust regression with weighting. Given that our Gini 
coefficients as well as Theil indexes are population-weighted, we run re-
gressions where we use population as weights. In addition, outliers affect 
the results in some cases so we also run robust regressions; unweighted 
and weighted. In Appendix Table E, we report the b estimates. Table 2 
shows how the the regression results for the 24 countries are correlated 
with the change in our Ginis. Since the regressions use data for the first 
and last years only, we also measure the change in the Gini between these 
two periods. 
 
Table 2: Correlation between change in Ginis and parameter esti-
mates for convergence at the country level  
23 EU countries + Norway, 24 observations 
Pearson correlation coefficients, with P values in brackets 
 Ordinary OLS 
Weighted 
least 
squares 
Robust 
regression 
Robust 
regression, 
weighted 
Ratio Gini 
last/first year 
0.54 
(0.0063) 
0.90 
(<0.0001) 
0.50 
(0.0128) 
0.95 
(<0.0001) 
Note: For regression results, see Appendix Table E. 
 
Using ordinary OLS estimates, there is a positive correlation (0.54), but 
not very high. The other columns demonstrate why: The main reason is 
that ordinary OLS is unweighted; when weighting is introduced the corre-
lation jumps to 0.90. Handling outliers increases the correlation even fur-
ther; to a maximum of 0.95 when we use the estimates from robust, 
weighted regressions. Weighting is clearly more important than outliers. 
For some countries, the results change dramatically between regressions: 
In Greece, for example (see Appendix Table E), OLS regressions suggest 
strong convergence whereas robust, weighted regressions show strong 
divergence (in line with the Ginis).  
 Hence at the country-level, the results show that convergence 
regressions and inequality indexes can give virtually identical results, but 
this depends crucially on whether calculations are weighted or not. As seen 
from Appendix Table E, the robust, weighted regressions indicate diver-
gence in the majority of cases. In 16 out of the 23 countries, there was a 
significant and positive b estimate, in line with our earlier results. 
 At the overall EU level, the matter is somewhat more complicated. 
In Appendix E, we also show, for illustrative purposes, convergence re-
gressions for the 24 countries combined (EU-23 +Norway). These results 
indicate convergence in the EEA, in line with our results based on Theil 
indexes. The problem with this common regression is however that the 
heterogeneity within countries is not taken into account. For this reason, 
residuals for each country will be correlated with the income levels of its 
regions, so standard assumptions about residuals will be violated.  
 Given that CEE countries are poorer that Western European coun-
tries, it is already implicitly clear from the results above that in the EU-27 
or EEA, 
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- regional inequality increased more in poor countries 
- regional inequality increased more in countries with faster growth.  
 
Hence the trends in regional inequality are related to income levels and 
growth. The correlations in Table 3 show this more precisely: 
 
Table 3: Correlations between income level, growth, 
Ginis and regression results for 23 EU countries + Norway 
Parameter b 
 
Growth rate 
in income 
per capita 
Gini trend OLS Robust, weighted 
Initial income per 
capita (y0) 
-0.58 
(0.0027) 
-0.69 
(0.0002) 
-0.52 
(0.0088) 
-0.61 
(0.0016) 
Growth rate in in-
come per capita  
0.57 
(0.0034) 
0.69 
(0.0002) 
0.63 
(0.0010) 
Note: P values in brackets. N=24. 
 
Hence the poorer is the country, the higher is growth and the higher is the 
increase in regional inequality. The latter applies whether we use Ginis or 
estimates from growth regressions.  
 But from the EU-level regressions as well as the analysis in Section 
3, we have seen that at the European level, the correlations are the oppo-
site: The poor grow faster. This point matters for regression analysis of 
convergence: It implies that the “within-group” (i.e. for each country) 
slopes vary across countries, and especially for many of the poorer coun-
ties the sign of the slope is opposite to the one that applies to the whole 
sample.  
 The implication of this is that standard panel regression techniques 
using fixed or random effects are not directly applicable, since they as-
sume that the constant term varies across regions or countries, but the 
slope is the same for all. Hence in convergence growth regressions, one 
might use techniques where variable slopes as well as intercepts are al-
lowed. Some experimentation with such regressions indicates that esti-
mates on overall EU convergence are sensitive to the set of dummies in-
cluded. This is one reason why we base our analysis of EU convergence  
on the Theil indexes, as undertaken in Section 3, and leave further work on 
EU-level regional convergence regressions as a task for future research. 
 
6. The role of regional disparities in total domestic inequality 
 
In all the calculations undertaken so far, the implicit assumption has been 
that all persons within a region have the same income. Within each region, 
however, income inequality exists due to urban rural disparities and class-
based income differences. In order to provide a full account of income 
inequality, we would have to include all inter-personal inequality. This 
would however require a completely different type of data.  
The difference is not only about aggregation, but also the income 
concept: Using GDP rather than data for household or personal income or 
consumption, we deliberately include more since the wealth of regions 
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does not only depend on personal consumption but also on public con-
sumption and investment. Hence one should not conclude that the ideal 
thing would be to use household consumption data, and that our macro-
approach is a matter of limited data.  
Nevertheless, it is clearly of interest to consider the role of regional 
disparities in overall domestic inequality. This is especially true for CEE 
countries since there has also been a fast increase in total inter-personal 
inequality in many CEE countries. The World Bank (2000, Chapter 4) 
provided documentation until the late 1990s. 
Given the incompatibility of regional GDP data and household 
consumption data, we shall approach these issues in a roundabout way: by 
comparing measures of regional inequality with measures of inter-personal 
income inequality. For inter-personal inequality, it is well known that re-
sults crucially depend on data and methodology and even for the same 
country and year, one may find estimates that vary widely (see e.g. Atkin-
son and Brandolini 2001). For this reason, it is important to use quality-
checked data. We use the UNU-WIDER (2008) database, which is more 
up-to-date than other similar databases, and where results are classified 
according to quality. We choose the years 2000-2001 in order to obtain the 
best possible data coverage, both for our own regional results and the in-
ter-personal Gini coefficients where data coverage is more limited for later 
years. In Appendix Table F, the data used in the following analysis are 
presented.  
In Diagram 8, we compare the two sets of inequality measures for 
selected countries. Recall that they are based on different income concepts 
and in spite of using quality-checked Ginis for inter-personal income ine-
quality we cannot guarantee full comparability across countries. The mate-
rial here should therefore be considered as a crude check only regarding 
the role of regional disparities in overall country-level inequality. Recall 
also that Ginis are not decomposable so we cannot from Ginis say any-
thing about the “share” of regional inequality in total inequality. What we 
do is to compare the ranking in the two cases, in order to shed some light 
on the relative role of regional gaps. 
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Diagram 8: Regional vs. personal income inequality. 
Gini coefficients, 2000.
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Rankings differ considerably across countries for the two measures. This is 
reflected in a correlation coefficient of 0.56.  Hence there is a correspon-
dence, but it is far from perfect. As illustrated by the case of the USA, high 
income inequality may be combined with modest regional inequality. On 
the other hand, we find cases such as Mexico, China and Russia where 
both types of inequality measures are high, and intermediate cases such as 
Turkey and Ukraine, where inter-personal inequality is high and regional 
inequality intermediate. From our earlier discussion, we have seen that 
Ukraine is approaching the top also for regional gaps.10 
Among CEE EU members, we observe that regional inequality is 
particularly important, in relative terms, for Latvia and Hungary. For Hun-
gary, this is well known from other studies (see Förster et al. 2003, 3), due 
to the dominant position of the capital region. Also for Russia and 
                                                 
10 Milanovic (2005) calculates population-weighted regional Ginis for 2000 also for India 
(18.7), Brazil (28.0) and Indonesia (19.9). Hence Brazil is also in the “top league” with 
respect to regional inequality. 
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Ukraine, we shall show in Section 7 that capital regions play an important 
role in inter-regional inequality. 
From the graph, one could also get the impression that the relative 
importance of inter-regional disparities is not ¼ as suggested by Kanbur 
and Venables (2007) but rather 30-40%. Such a conclusion can however 
not be drawn here since the two indexes have been constructed from dif-
ferent data.  If we had personal income data for the regions, we could cal-
culate inequality indexes that are decomposable and additive (such as the 
Theil index) and express exactly how large is the share of inter-regional 
inequality in the total. Using data from the Luxembourg Income Study (for 
household disposable income), Förster et al. (2003, 11) calculated Theil 
indexes and found that inter-regional inequality accounted for a mere 10% 
of domestic inequality in Russia in 1995. This shows that different income 
concepts render different results and that we should be cautious when 
comparing indexes based on different data. Diagram 8 may indicate that 
gaps in regional GDP are larger than regional gaps in disposable house-
hold income. More research is however needed in order to draw firm con-
clusions.11  
 
7. The role of capital regions in regional inequality 
 
As already noted, one issue for Russia is whether increased regional ine-
quality is mainly driven by a few regions. It is well known that growth has 
been faster in the capital region, and some regions have also experienced 
fast growth because of oil and gas resources and prices. For example, the 
Tyumen region in 2005 had average nominal GDP per capita almost 6 
times the Russian average. As an illustration of the impact of these two 
regions alone (i.e. Moscow and Tyumen), we calculate Ginis also without 
them. This is shown in Diagram 9. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 For some CIS countries, income-based Ginis show larger inequality than consumption-
based calculations (World Bank 2000, 144). Hence a detailed examination of data and 
methodology is important to sort out how different measures are related. 
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Diagram 9: Ginis for Russian regions 1995-2005
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The curve on top is based on our results presented earlier. At the bottom, 
Ginis for Russia without Moscow and Tyumen are presented, showing 
little change in inequality. Hence for Russia, most of the change is driven 
by these two regions.  
It has been observed that strong growth in capital regions has been 
an important feature in some CEE countries. Landesmann and Römisch 
(2006, 6) find that except for Romania, most of the increase in inter-re-
gional inequality in CEE EU member countries until 2002 was due to 
capital regions. This was 100% true for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Bulgaria, while in Poland and Hungary, some increase in regional disparity 
took place in 1995-2002 also when capital regions were left out of the 
analysis. 
There is however nothing “abnormal” about this; it is a standard 
aspect of regional inequality that capital regions grow faster. Faster growth 
in capital regions is not an explanation, but a feature of inequality. There 
may be different reasons why this happens.  For example, in Melchior 
(2008) we describe a hub-and-spoke pattern where capitals act as transport 
or services hubs and this may provide a mechanism by which income gaps 
may increase.  
In the following, we add another simple test on the role of capital 
regions, in order to shed light on the issue: We calculate the ratio between 
income per capita in capital regions and the respective national averages. 
For this purpose, we generally use the most detailed definition of capital 
regions, except for Poland where NUT3 data are missing. The “narrow-
ness” of capital regions may vary across countries and for that reasons 
there is also here a question about comparability. For example, we shall 
observe that France has a very high ratio, which may partly be because the 
capital region is here narrowly delineated; if surrounding areas had been 
 25
included, the figure would drop. With this reservation in mind, the com-
parison is still of some value. The results are shown in Diagram 10, with 
CEE countries in darker colour.  
 
Diagram 10: Ratios between income per capita in capital regions 
to national average, 2005
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Hence France and USA top the ranking but except for this, the upper part 
of the ranking is dominated by CEE countries. If we plot this income ratio 
against the regional Ginis, we see even clearer that France and the USA 
are outliers but except for that, there is a rather clear correspondence be-
tween the two. This is presented in Diagram 11, using Ginis at the NUTS2 
level.  
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Diagram 11: Regional inequality and the income of the capital region
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At the NUTS2 level, the correlation coefficient between the two is 0.41, at 
the NUTS3 level 0.61. If we drop the two outliers (France and the USA), 
the correlation increases to 0.82 at the NUTS2 level (while it remains 0.61 
for NUTS3). This correlation is another indication to the effect that higher 
income in capital regions is indeed a normal feature of regional inequality. 
For Russia as well as Ukraine, it is evident that higher income in capital 
regions is an important component of their high regional inequality.  
 
8. A note on regional PPPs 
 
In this paper, calculations have relied on income data based on national 
deflators rather than region-specific ones. As noted, this creates potentially 
a bias if price changes vary across regions. For small and rich Western 
European countries such as Norway or Denmark or Belgium, with a devel-
oped commercial infrastructure, we would expect that inter-regional price 
differences are present but modest. The situation may be completely dif-
ferent in large middle-income countries such as e.g. India, China, Turkey 
or Russia. The less developed is the infrastructure, the more fragmented is 
a country, and if infrastructure is correlated with income, this should be a 
larger problem in poorer countries. Developing countries may also have 
less modernised regions with more poverty; with different consumption 
baskets compared to major cities. Hence (as a hypothesis) low income 
combined with large country size renders it more likely that price differ-
ences across regions are more important.   
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An interesting case in question is Russia. If prices as well as infla-
tion rates have been lower in peripheral regions, the result could be that 
inter-regional inequality is over-estimated with the use of nominal income 
data, and it is also possible that the change over time is exaggerated due to 
different inflation rates. For Russia, Gluschenko (2006) has demonstrated 
the problems and limitations with currently available price deflators for 
regions. According to Gluschenko, the regional consumer price index for 
Russia is not a plausible alternative for deflation of regional GRP. Data for 
Russia, however (but not Ukraine), include an index of change in real GRP 
from 1996 to 2004, and we assume this has been constructed using some 
broader GRP deflator.12 As a first approximation to the price issue, we 
therefore use nominal GRP values for 1996 and calculate the change to 
2004 using the real GRP index. Diagram 12 shows the result. 
 
Diagram 12: Ginis for Russian regions 1995-2005
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Hence according to the real GRP approximation, there was not much 
change in inequality. This is however just a first crude test and further re-
search for Russia as well as for other nations is necessary in order to ad-
dress the price issue properly. The purpose here has been to raise the issue 
and make clear that for some countries, research on the price issue may be 
necessary if we are to draw firm conclusions about real income inequality. 
 
9. Concluding comments 
 
Compared to earlier research, this paper has examined regional inequality 
with a data set extended to more recent years and to more countries. We 
have shown that within-country regional income differences have re-
mained stable in most of Western Europe but increased in Central and 
Eastern European countries; in some cases considerably. For the EU-27 as 
                                                 
12 It has so far been impossible to obtain more information about this; in spite of some 
efforts. 
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a whole, income convergence across countries has however been quantita-
tively more significant than the rise in domestic regional inequality so on 
the whole, there has clearly been convergence – especially after 2000.  The 
reduction in inequality across countries also implies that from this point 
onward, domestic regional inequality is quantitatively more important than 
inequality across countries.  
Our comparative study of regional inequality in 36 countries sug-
gests that such inequality is particularly important for some medium-sized 
to large middle income countries, such as Russia, China, Mexico and 
Ukraine. Based on other studies (Milanovic 2005) we could also add Bra-
zil. For such countries, price differences across regions may however also 
be important and there is a risk that nominal income data causes an exag-
geration of inequality levels. Our preliminary evidence for Russia suggests 
that more research should be done in order to correct for price differences 
across regions. 
The purpose of this paper has been to provide an updated a com-
prehensive assessment of regional inequality in Europe and beyond. We 
have also shown how changes in inequality are related to income levels 
and growth rates, and addressed some methodological issues that are rele-
vant in future work in the field. However the task of explaining the reasons 
for levels and changes in inequality has been left for further research. 
Given that an increase in regional inequality has occurred in a 
number of countries at the same time as globalisation and wider European 
integration, there could be a temptation to jump to premature conclusions 
about causality: Regional inequality is caused by globalisation or integra-
tion. This is however far from clear, and specific research is needed to 
explain the rise in regional inequality.13 One possibility is that increased 
regional inequality is a temporary “Kuznets-like” phenomenon where 
some regions grow first, and others catch up at a later stage. Another pos-
sibility, however, is that inequalities are more permanent due to agglom-
eration mechanisms, technology gaps or other forces. More research 
should be undertaken to address such issues. 
 
 
References 
Atkinson, A.B. and A. Brandolini, 2001, Promise and pitfalls in the Use of “Sec-
ondary” Data-Sets: Income Inequality in OECD Countries as a Case Study, 
Journal of Economic Literature XXXIX: 771-799. 
Barro, R.J. and X. Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Economic Growth, McGraw Hill. 
Ben-David, D., 1999, Trade and Convergence Among Countries, Journal of In-
ternational Economics 40: 279-298. 
                                                 
13 In a companion paper (Melchior 2008), we ask how EU enlargement could affect 
regional disparities in CEE countries and a preliminary empirical check does not provide 
any support for the hypothesis that east-west European integration has promoted higher 
regional inequality.  
 
 29
Brülhart, M. and P. Koenig, 2006, New economic geography meets Comecon: 
Regional wages and industry location in central Europe, Economics of Tran-
sition 14(2): 245-267. 
Cappelen, A., J. Fagerberg and B. Verspagen, 1999, Lack of regional conver-
gence, Chapter 6, pp. 130-148 in J. Fagerberg, P. Guerreri and B. Verspagen 
(eds.), The Economic Challenge for Europe. Adapting to Innovation Based 
Growth. Edward Elgar. 
Combes, P.-P. and H.G. Overman, 2004, The Spatial Distribution of Economic 
Activities in the European Union, Chapter 64, pp. 2845-2909 in J. Vernon 
Henderson and J-F. Thisse (eds.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Eco-
nomics, Volume 4, Cities and Geography, Amsterdam: Elsevier.  
Cowell, F.A., 2000, Measurement of inequality, Chapter 2, pp. 87-166 in A. B. 
Atkinson and F. Bourgignon (eds.), Handbook of Income Distribution, Vol-
ume 1, Amsterdam: North-Holland, Handbooks in Economics 16. 
Eurostat, 2007, Regions in the European Union. Nomenclature of territorial units 
for statistics.  NUTS 2006/EU27. Eurostat Methodologies and Working Pa-
pers, 2007 edition.  
Förster, M., D. Jesuit and T. Smeeding, 2003, Regional Poverty and Income Ine-
quality in Central and Eastern Europe. Evidence from the Luxembourg In-
come Study. United Nations University/WIDER, Discussion Paper No. 
2003/65. 
Gluschenko, K., 2006, Biases in cross-space comparisons through cross-time 
price indexes: The case of Russia, Helsinki, Bank of Finland, BOFIT Discus-
sion Papers 9/2006. 
Kanbur, R. and A.J. Venables, 2007, Spatial Disparities and Economic Develop-
ment, pp. 204-215, Chapter 9 in Held, D. and A. Kaya (eds.), Global Ine-
quality, London: Polity Press. 
Landesmann, M. and R. Römisch, 2006, Economic Growth, Regional Disparities 
and Employment in the EU-27, Vienna: WIIW Research Report 333. 
Melchior, A., 2008, European Integration and Domestic Regions, forthcoming 
(earlier version available at ENEPO website, see www.case.com.pl). 
Milanovic, B., 2005, Half a World: Regional Inequality in Five Great Federa-
tions. Washington DC: World Bank, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 3699. 
Römisch, R., 2003, Regional Disparities within Accession Countries, in Tumpel-
Gugerell, G. and P. Mooslechner (eds.), Economic convergence and diver-
gence in Europe: Growth and regional development in an enlarged European 
Union, Austrian National Bank/ Edward Elgar, 183-208. 
UNU-WIDER, 2008, World Income Inequality Database, Version 2.0c, May 
2008, see http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/. 
World Bank, 2000, Making Transition Work for All, Washington DC: The World 
Bank.  
 30
 
Appendix Table A1: Data sources 
Eurostat Regio database, available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu  
EU-27, Croatia, Turkey, USA, Canada, 
Mexico, Japan, South Korea, Australia.  
National statistical agencies used for:  Norway, supplementary data Russia, Ukraine, China 
World Bank: World Development Indicators 2007 Supplementary population data for some countries 
 
Appendix Table A2: Data coverage for domestic regional 
inequality beyond EU-27 
 Country Classifi-cation Years 
Number of 
regions 
Average po-
pulation of 
regions 2001 
Australia National 1990-2006 8 2426 
Canada National 1990-2006 12 2585 
China National 1995-2006 30 43044 
Croatia NUTS3 2001-2005 21 211 
Japan National 1990-2005 10 12731 
South Korea National 1990-2005 7 6765 
Mexico National 1993-2004 32 3116 
NUTS2 7 645 Norway NUTS3 
1995 and 
1997-2005 19 238 
Russia National 1995-2005 79 1802 
NUTS1 12 5697 
NUTS2 26 2629 Turkey 
NUTS3 
1995-2001
81 844 
Ukraine National 1996-2005 26 1846 
USA National 1997-2006 51 5593 
 31 
Appendix Table B: Gini coefficients (population-weighted) for inter-regional inequality within selected countries 
Country NUTS N used 
Avg. 
Pop. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
2 9 894 12.38 12.57 12.15 11.88 11.85 11.61 11.96 11.99 11.73 11.48 11.42 Austria 
3 35 230 17.18 17.37 17.06 16.85 16.74 16.59 16.78 16.72 16.64 16.35 16.06 
2 11 935 16.91 17.11 17.17 16.83 17.33 17.50 17.53 17.72 17.43 17.54 17.80 Belgium 
3 42 239 20.02 20.12 20.09 19.94 20.16 20.05 20.11 20.17 19.74 19.95 20.15 
2 6 1319   10.81 10.57 10.60 12.87 11.31 12.22 13.77 13.71 14.55 15.03 Bulgaria 
3 28 283   16.12 13.86 15.16 17.32 17.31 18.50 19.38 18.88 19.54 21.01 
2 8 1278 9.72 9.76 10.38 11.98 13.13 13.89 14.71 15.18 15.12 14.51 14.70 Czech Republic 
3 14 731 10.10 10.08 10.95 12.52 13.35 14.16 14.89 15.36 15.33 14.74 14.92 
1 16 5146 10.38 10.34 10.34 10.49 10.64 10.79 11.03 10.87 10.76 10.68 10.72 
2 39 2111 12.47 12.40 12.39 12.57 12.70 12.77 12.98 12.74 12.62 12.45 12.52 Germany 
3 415 192 20.35 20.43 20.57 20.77 20.67 20.63 20.78 20.47 20.53 20.40 20.51 
Estonia 3 5 273   16.31 18.19 19.45 19.12 20.13 20.48 20.93 21.28 22.63 21.27 
1 7 5817 10.65 10.85 11.11 11.55 11.80 11.77 11.62 11.22 10.70 10.39 10.03 
2 19 2143 11.84 12.08 12.32 12.69 12.98 12.96 12.80 12.38 11.86 11.56 11.21 Spain 
3 49 778 12.56 12.87 13.15 13.55 13.88 13.80 13.62 13.25 12.68 12.34 11.94 
2 5 1038 7.82 8.43 8.55 9.47 9.82 9.61 9.74 9.34 8.46 8.58 8.59 Finland 
3 20 259 10.89 11.52 11.70 13.08 13.95 13.97 14.10 13.63 12.43 12.45 12.76 
1 8 7432 11.08 11.23 11.37 11.11 11.76 11.77 11.53 11.66 11.72 11.20 11.20 
2 22 2702 11.97 12.17 12.22 11.98 12.65 12.87 12.65 12.68 12.74 12.31 12.24 France 
3 96 619 28.47 28.79 28.69 29.76 28.49 29.02 30.20 29.87 29.11 26.66 28.82 
2 13 842 7.79 7.26 6.90 6.55 6.51 12.09 12.56 13.56 13.70 14.40 15.53 Greece 
3 51 215 9.22 9.67 9.58 9.58 9.57 14.26 15.04 15.89 16.18 16.70 17.95 
Croatia 3 21 211             20.37 19.66 20.61 20.79 21.00 
2 7 1455 15.51 16.61 17.57 17.65 19.05 19.65 19.86 21.01 20.30 20.02 21.41 Hungary 
3 20 509 19.56 20.77 21.52 21.87 22.95   23.25 24.39 23.82 23.71 25.29 
Ireland 3 8 480 11.43 11.72 13.01 13.68 13.12 13.18 13.17 14.65 14.73 14.46 14.73 
1 5 11396 13.71 13.82 13.64 13.59 13.33 13.44 13.25 13.13 13.14 12.99 12.61 
2 21 2713 14.98 15.13 14.83 14.80 14.46 15.18 14.92 14.86 14.75 14.72 14.35 Italy 
3 99 559 16.30 16.37 16.16 16.24 16.16 16.88 16.96 16.60 16.45 16.65 16.23 
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Appendix Table B: Gini coefficients (population-weighted) for inter-regional inequality within selected countries 
Country NUTS N used 
Avg. 
Pop. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Lithuania 3 10 348 7.53 7.53 9.56 10.63 11.74 12.30 13.45 14.93 15.10 15.00 15.87 
Latvia 3 6 393   18.45 20.65 24.44 26.61 27.45 25.76 28.98 27.52 29.98 28.54 
2 12 1337 6.96 7.54 7.65 7.69 7.95 8.05 7.45 7.81 7.64 7.83 8.02 Netherlands 
3 38 394 11.29 11.73 11.74 11.95 11.95 12.25 11.57 12.04 12.06 12.46 12.69 
2 7 645 11.38   12.71 13.54 13.71 13.54 12.77 12.50 11.70 12.05 12.53 Norway 
3 19 238 13.27   14.68 15.70 16.23 15.62 15.56 14.38 14.36 14.75 15.45 
1 6 7650 6.61 7.66 8.18 8.88 9.95 9.78 10.34 10.03 10.24 10.23 10.99 Poland 
2 16 2391 9.34 10.68 10.91 11.44 12.49 12.38 13.05 12.84 12.92 13.01 13.66 
2 7 1470 11.62 11.57 12.38 12.74 11.66 12.54 12.09 12.57 12.87 13.03 13.06 Portugal 
3 30 343 18.35 18.06 18.65 18.85 18.01 18.79 18.38 18.49 18.76 18.97 19.11 
2 8 2801       10.65 13.24 16.38 16.62 16.73 15.46 15.35 17.44 Romania 
3 42 534       15.36 16.52 19.94 19.73 21.09 19.42 18.77 21.92 
2 8 1112 6.70 7.22 8.30 8.73 9.51 9.31 9.04 8.90 8.93 9.14 9.58 Sweden 
3 21 424 6.99 7.75 9.10 9.52 10.33 10.13 9.73 9.50 9.48 9.73 10.17 
Slovenia 3 12 166 11.64 11.62 11.58 11.55 12.34 12.22 12.61 12.76 13.72 13.54 13.78 
2 4 1076 16.71 16.13 16.43 16.28 16.49 16.89 16.36 16.82 17.40 17.89 20.36 Slovakia 
3 8 672 18.24 17.83 18.19 18.24 18.32 18.64 18.48 18.63 19.06 19.42 22.06 
1 12 5697 22.22 22.31 22.48 21.78 21.46 21.43 21.06         
2 26 2629 24.98 24.78 24.83 23.86 23.71 23.91 23.81         Turkey 
3 81 844 26.91 26.54 26.82 25.72 25.58 25.70 25.86         
1 12 4926 8.17 8.42 8.82 9.33 9.70 9.98 9.84 10.10 10.23 10.31 10.46 
2 35 1664 11.65 12.00 12.82 13.43 13.86 14.42 14.34 14.58 14.62 14.51 14.66 United Kingdom 
3 126 462 14.62 14.82 16.76 17.38 18.08 18.72 18.86 19.14 19.16 18.99 18.96 
Canada 12 2585 7.13 7.41 7.86 7.25 7.36 8.59 8.44 7.65 8.22 8.59 9.49 
USA  51 5593     7.14 7.31 7.63 8.16 8.06 7.65 7.47 7.55 7.60 
Mexico 32 3116 28.54 28.31 28.66 28.93 29.08 29.66 29.12 29.79 29.49 28.98   
Japan  10 12731 6.46 6.30 6.50 6.46 6.55 6.61 6.48 6.48 6.50 6.48 6.60 
Korea 7 6765 3.32 2.60 1.87 2.82 3.24 3.10 3.43 3.29 3.07 2.96 2.73 
Australia  8 2426 3.91 4.19 4.12 3.98 3.91 4.57 4.77 4.55 4.82 4.40 4.33 
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Appendix Table B: Gini coefficients (population-weighted) for inter-regional inequality within selected countries 
Country NUTS N used 
Avg. 
Pop. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Russia 79 1802 24.63 27.14 29.08 29.36 32.64 36.27 35.05 33.93 34.21 35.44 37.79 
Ukraine  26 1846   13.06 15.47 16.35 17.40 18.43 22.69 22.87 23.52 24.84 24.83 
China 30 43044 29.70 29.80 30.10 30.50 31.00 29.60 31.20 31.50 31.90 32.10 30.70 
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Appendix Table C: Inequality between and within countries in the EU, including Theil indexes with decomposition 
Year Area ana-
lysed 
Classifi-
cation Inequality index 1995 1996 1997 1998a 1998b 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
EU-27 Country Theil Total     0.0615 0.0614 0.0610 0.0577 0.0535 0.0499 0.0468 0.0440 
Within     0.0302 0.0316 0.0335 0.0335 0.0340 0.0336 0.0329 0.0339 
Between     0.0621 0.0620 0.0616 0.0583 0.0541 0.0505 0.0472 0.0444 EU-27 NUTS2 Theil 
Total     0.0923 0.0936 0.0951 0.0918 0.0880 0.0841 0.0802 0.0784 
Within     0.0566 0.0585 0.0614 0.0614 0.0616 0.0605 0.0598 0.0609 
Between     0.0500 0.0506 0.0501 0.0463 0.0424 0.0390 0.0368 0.0342 EU-27 NUTS3 Theil 
Total     0.1066 0.1091 0.1116 0.1077 0.1040 0.0996 0.0966 0.0951 
Country 15.12 14.61 13.87 13.47 16.11 16.09 15.76 15.18 14.92 14.50 14.45 13.91 
NUTS1 19.59 20.09 19.69 19.53 21.80 21.87 21.93 21.44 20.87 20.43 19.97 19.56 
NUTS2 20.97 21.49 21.16 21.06 23.28 23.39 23.51 23.11 22.58 22.11 21.61 21.30 
EU-27 
NUTS3 
Gini 
21.00 22.23 22.23 22.27 24.66 24.83 24.70 24.78 24.26 23.86 23.46 23.23 
Country 6.65 6.25 5.53  5.19 5.22 4.82 4.41 4.67 4.68 5.25 4.97 
NUTS1 13.63 13.51 13.23  13.19 13.32 13.42 13.13 12.94 12.91 12.89 12.75 
NUTS2 15.17 15.09 14.89  14.91 15.07 15.26 15.04 14.86 14.76 14.68 14.59 
EU-15 
NUTS3 
Gini 
18.24 18.27 18.35  18.46 18.60 18.89 18.80 18.55 18.49 18.44 18.34 
Country 15.24 14.79 14.12 13.66 16.24 16.24 16.05 15.42 15.12 14.71 14.71 14.31 
NUTS1 19.51 20.03 19.66 19.45 21.68 21.76 21.92 21.39 20.82 20.38 19.99 19.69 EEA 
NUTS2 
Gini 
20.92 21.48 21.18 21.05 23.25 23.38 23.59 23.18 22.62 22.17 21.72 21.52 
Note: Calculations for 1998a and earlier are excluding Malta and Romania, while calculations for 1998b and later are including these. 
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Appendix Table D: Regression of time trends for Gini coefficients 
Country NUTS level Estimate t value P value Adj. R2 
2 -0.092 -4.92 0.0008 0.70 Austria 
3 -0.102 -6.86 <.0001 0.82 
2 0.081 4.96 0.0008 0.70 Belgium 
3 -0.006 -0.47 0.6468 -0.08 
2 0.515 6.98 0.0001 0.84 Bulgaria 
3 0.665 6.60 0.0002 0.83 
2 0.601 6.86 <.0001 0.82 Czech Republic 
3 0.574 6.87 <.0001 0.82 
1 0.050 3.17 0.0114 0.47 
2 0.016 0.92 0.3824 -0.02 Germany 
3 0.001 0.07 0.9481 -0.11 
Estonia 3 0.549 6.75 0.0001 0.83 
1 -0.064 -1.15 0.2811 0.03 
2 -0.067 -1.23 0.2498 0.05 Spain 
3 -0.068 -1.14 0.2828 0.03 
2 0.035 0.53 0.6075 -0.08 Finland 
3 0.150 1.54 0.1582 0.12 
1 0.022 0.83 0.4276 -0.03 
2 0.045 1.57 0.1511 0.13 France 
3 -0.033 -0.35 0.7371 -0.10 
2 0.979 6.35 0.0001 0.80 Greece 
3 0.997 8.50 <.0001 0.88 
Croatia 3 0.239 1.86 0.1602 0.38 
2 0.535 8.41 <.0001 0.87 Hungary 
3 0.479 8.69 <.0001 0.89 
Ireland 3 0.315 6.34 0.0001 0.80 
1 -0.103 -9.78 <.0001 0.90 
2 -0.040 -1.89 0.0917 0.20 Italy 
3 0.029 1.08 0.3087 0.02 
Lithuania 3 0.896 14.54 <.0001 0.95 
Latvia 3 1.072 5.12 0.0009 0.74 
2 0.056 2.24 0.0519 0.29 Netherlands 
3 0.097 4.14 0.0025 0.62 
2 -0.029 -0.34 0.7443 -0.11 Norway 
3 0.061 0.65 0.5341 -0.07 
1 0.373 6.92 <.0001 0.82 Poland 
2 0.366 7.55 <.0001 0.85 
2 0.131 3.74 0.0046 0.57 Portugal 
3 0.068 2.40 0.0399 0.32 
2 0.660 2.53 0.0446 0.44 Romania 
3 0.677 2.82 0.0304 0.50 
2 0.217 3.71 0.0048 0.56 Sweden 
3 0.221 3.00 0.0149 0.45 
Slovenia 3 0.250 8.88 <.0001 0.89 
2 0.265 3.18 0.0112 0.48 Slovakia 
 3 0.263 3.45 0.0072 0.52 
1 -0.224 -4.91 0.0044 0.79 
2 -0.227 -3.98 0.0105 0.71 Turkey 
3 -0.216 -3.14 0.0256 0.60 
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Appendix Table D: Regression of time trends for Gini coefficients 
Country NUTS level Estimate t value P value Adj. R2 
1 0.226 9.40 <.0001 0.90 
2 0.302 6.67 <.0001 0.81 United Kingdom 
3 0.453 5.79 0.0003 0.76 
Canada  0.201 5.13 0.0004 0.70 
USA  0.030 0.85 0.4184 -0.03 
Mexico  0.115 2.96 0.0182 0.46 
Japan  0.013 1.82 0.1028 0.19 
South Korea  0.030 0.69 0.5080 -0.06 
Australia  0.064 3.03 0.0127 0.43 
Russia  1.145 6.58 0.0001 0.81 
Ukraine  1.382 12.37 <.0001 0.94 
China  0.198 3.35 0.0085 0.51 
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Appendix Table E: Growth convergence regressions, results for the convergence parameter b 
OLS Weigthed least squares Robust regression Robust, weighted regression Country 
b est. P value Adj. R2 b est. P value Adj. R2 b est. P value R2 b est. P value R2 
Obs. 
Austria -0.06 0.2104 0.02 -0.06 0.0510 0.08 -0.09 0.0364 0.09 -0.08 0.0099 0.13 35 
Belgium 0.07 0.1033 0.04 0.00 0.9185 -0.02 0.07 0.1400 0.05 0.00 0.9828 0.00 42 
Bulgaria -0.10 0.5324 -0.02 0.15 0.1909 0.03 -0.18 0.2646 0.01 0.20 0.0717 0.11 28 
Czech Republic 0.38 0.0098 0.39 0.37 0.0027 0.50 0.44 <.0001 0.23 0.41 <.0001 0.22 14 
Germany -0.07 <.0001 0.06 -0.05 0.0004 0.03 -0.07 <.0001 0.05 -0.04 0.0017 0.02 414 
Estonia 0.36 0.0854 0.57 0.33 0.0438 0.72 0.36 <.0001 0.50 0.31 0.0249 0.74 5 
Spain -0.08 0.0238 0.08 -0.07 0.0110 0.11 -0.07 0.0406 0.07 -0.07 0.0155 0.12 49 
Finland -0.05 0.6474 -0.04 0.12 0.1214 0.08 -0.10 0.2921 0.05 0.12 0.1324 0.13 20 
France 0.00 0.9636 -0.01 0.03 0.0382 0.03 -0.01 0.7785 0.00 0.03 0.0709 0.03 96 
Greece -0.22 0.0651 0.05 0.32 0.0678 0.05 -0.23 0.0505 0.07 0.66 0.0004 0.11 51 
Hungary 0.21 0.1558 0.06 0.23 0.0301 0.19 0.24 0.0349 0.14 0.31 <.0001 0.38 20 
Ireland 0.23 0.279 0.06 0.27 0.1631 0.18 0.17 0.0002 0.26 0.20 <.0001 0.46 8 
Italy -0.09 <.0001 0.14 -0.04 0.0622 0.03 -0.08 0.0001 0.10 -0.04 0.0348 0.04 99 
Lithuania 0.63 0.0318 0.39 0.89 0.0105 0.53 0.62 0.0183 0.40 0.90 0.0026 0.55 10 
Latvia 0.39 0.2433 0.15 0.56 0.0813 0.47 0.41 0.1781 0.27 0.73 <.0001 0.65 6 
Netherlands 0.03 0.6718 -0.02 0.09 0.0643 0.07 0.03 0.5663 0.01 0.09 0.0691 0.09 38 
Norway 0.08 0.3495 0.00 0.07 0.2312 0.03 0.08 0.3940 0.05 0.07 0.2657 0.08 19 
Poland 0.24 0.1278 0.10 0.34 0.0408 0.21 -0.02 0.8787 0.00 0.32 0.0595 0.11 16 
Portugal -0.07 0.3463 0.00 -0.03 0.6143 -0.03 -0.12 0.0935 0.07 -0.02 0.7444 0.00 30 
Romania 0.30 0.0244 0.10 0.45 0.0003 0.27 0.32 0.0296 0.10 0.47 <.0001 0.25 42 
Sweden 0.20 0.1625 0.05 0.34 0.0002 0.51 0.25 0.0951 0.05 0.35 <.0001 0.52 21 
Slovenia 0.18 0.1461 0.12 0.17 0.0429 0.28 0.16 0.1789 0.16 0.15 0.0819 0.27 122 
Slovakia 0.18 0.0315 0.49 0.18 0.0347 0.48 0.18 0.0167 0.45 0.17 0.0162 0.46 8 
United Kingdom 0.09 0.0505 0.02 0.12 0.0018 0.07 0.09 0.0667 0.03 0.12 0.0043 0.07 126 
EU23+Norway -0.16 <.0001 0.23 -0.16 <.0001 0.24 -0.16 <.0001 0.18 -0.15 <.0001 0.19 1209 
Note: For weighted regressions, population 2000 has been used as weights (2001 for Hungary). 
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Appendix Table F: Data for comparing regional and inter-
personal income inequality at the country level. 
Regional inequa-
lity 
Inter-personal 
income inequality, 
Gini coefficients Country 
NUTS 
level 
2000 2001 2000 2001 
2 11.61 11.96 Austria 
3 16.59 16.78 
23.7 23.7 
2 17.50 17.53 Belgium 
3 20.05 20.11 
29.6 29.3 
2 11.31 12.22 Bulgaria 
3 17.31 18.50 
30.8 31.4 
2 13.89 14.71 Czech Republic 
3 14.16 14.89 
27.0 27.2 
1 10.79 11.03 
2 12.77 12.98 Germany 
3 20.63 20.78 
29.8 30.1 
Estonia 3 20.13 20.48 36.4 35.4 
1 11.77 11.62 
2 12.96 12.80 Spain 
3 13.80 13.62 
32.6 32.5 
2 9.61 9.74 Finland 
3 13.97 14.10 
28.8 27.9 
1 11.77 11.53 
2 12.87 12.65 France 
3 29.02 30.20 
28.2 27.6 
2 12.09 12.56 Greece 
3 14.26 15.04 
32.3 32.3 
2 19.65 19.86 Hungary 
3   23.25 
25.0 25.7 
Ireland 3 13.18 13.17 30.1 28.9 
1 13.44 13.25 
2 15.18 14.92 Italy 
3 16.88 16.96 
33.4 29.2 
Lithuania 3 12.30 13.45 34.7 34.5 
Latvia 3 27.45 25.76 33.7 33.2 
2 8.05 7.45 Netherlands 
3 12.25 11.57 
25.5 25.8 
2 13.54 12.77 Norway 
3 15.62 15.56 
28.8 26.5 
1 9.78 10.34 Poland 
2 12.38 13.05 
34.2 34.0 
2 12.54 12.09 Portugal 
3 18.79 18.38 
34.7 37.1 
2 16.38 16.62 Romania 
3 19.94 19.73 
30.3 35.3 
2 9.31 9.04 Sweden 
3 10.13 9.73 
29.2 26.1 
Slovenia 3 12.22 12.61 24.8 24.5 
2 16.89 16.36 Slovakia 
3 18.64 18.48 
24.3 26.2 
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Appendix Table F: Data for comparing regional and inter-
personal income inequality at the country level. 
Regional inequa-
lity 
Inter-personal 
income inequality, 
Gini coefficients Country 
NUTS 
level 
2000 2001 2000 2001 
Table E, continued: 
1 21.43 21.06 
2 23.91 23.81 Turkey 
3 25.70 25.86 
39.8 n.a. 
1 9.98 9.84 
2 14.42 14.34 United Kingdom 
3 18.72 18.86 
31.5 30.8 
Canada 8.59 8.44 32.4 n.a. 
USA 8.16 8.06 40.1 n.a. 
Mexico 29.66 29.12 53.2 50.9 
Australia 4.57 4.77 31.0 31.1 
Russia 36.27 35.05 43.2 42.2 
Ukraine 18.43 22.69 36.3 36.4 
China 29.60 31.20 39.0 44.8 
Note: Results for regional inequality are from own calculations, se Ap-
pendix B. Results for inter-personal inequality sre from the UNU-WIDER 
inequality database (UNU-WIDER 2008), see 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/ 
 
